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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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16 FEB 1972

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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16 FEBRUARY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 7)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 7 - 13 FEBRUARY 1972

<u>Moscow (3013 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1606 items)</u>		
Indochina	(12%)	21%	Domestic Issues	(20%)	46%
[World Assembly	(1%)	13%]	Indochina	(28%)	26%
Meeting, Versailles			[U.S., PRG	(21%)	13%]
[Soviet Government	(--)	6%]	Proposals		
Statement on U.S.,			Ulster Situation	(--)	3%
PRG Proposals			UN Security Council	(11%)	3%
China	(4%)	8%	Special Session		
European Security	(13%)	7%	in Africa		
[Warsaw Pact PCC	(12%)	6%]			
Meeting					
Ulster Situation	(5%)	2%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi's continuing sharp attacks on the Nixon Administration's policy include a 13 February NHAN DAN Commentator article which is personally abusive of the President and says his foreign policy report to Congress contains "nothing but a lot of deceitful and hypocritical rhetoric." Commentator and other propagandists discern further evidence of the "hypocrisy" of the U.S. eight-point peace plan in such current moves as the dispatch of more B-52's and aircraft carriers to the Indochina area. Apparently with the President's summitry in mind, Commentator repeats the line that by expressing readiness to negotiate, the United States is scheming to divide the socialist camp.

Hanoi propaganda surrounding the 11-13 February Versailles congress on Indochina was highlighted by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's greetings in which he affirmed the Vietnamese communists' rejection of the U.S. peace plan. He insisted that the PRG had proposed the proper course and repeated the demands in the PRG's 2 February "elaboration" that the United States set a date for complete withdrawal and that President Thieu resign immediately. Propagandists see further U.S. "sabotage" of the Paris talks in Ambassador Porter's refusal to set a date for the next session because of the Versailles congress.

On 11 February, shortly after TASS announced that Kosygin had received the DRV ambassador at the latter's request, the Soviet Government issued a statement belatedly assailing the U.S. eight-point plan and supporting the PRG's 2 February "elaboration." The statement showed reluctance to address specific points at issue between the two sides and was notably circumspect in failing to mention the President--a failure presumably related to his forthcoming Moscow visit. Brezhnev's message to the Versailles gathering duly supported the "legitimate demands" of the Indochinese peoples but mentioned no specific plans.

A week before President Nixon's arrival in Peking, the Chinese offered another reassurance of support to their Indochinese allies. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 14th, denouncing recent U.S. military moves as "war blackmail," pledged that the Chinese will "in all circumstances" fulfill their "proletarian internationalist duty" to support the anti-U.S. war in Indochina.

NHAN DAN'S COMMENTATOR ASSAILS PRESIDENT NIXON'S POLICIES

Last year the President's foreign policy report, released on 25 February at the time of the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos,

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prompted a 2 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement which assailed his Vietnamization policy and his "threats" against North Vietnam. There has been no such official reaction this year, but the President's 9 February report is treated scathingly in the NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 13th. This article appeared on the heels of a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 10th which had harked back to last year's foreign policy report in criticizing the United States for espousing a policy of negotiating from a position of strength. The article on the 10th used language similar to Truong Chinh's* in his speech at the Fatherland Front Congress in December--belatedly released textually on 1 February--when it referred to U.S. readiness to negotiate with a number of countries, especially the Soviet Union and China. Unlike Commentator, however, Truong Chinh had not cited the President's 1971 foreign policy report.

The Commentator article on the 13th does not refer explicitly to U.S. negotiations with China and the Soviet Union,** but instead says that under the label of "readiness to negotiate," the United States "is seeking perfidious schemes in order to divide the socialist camp and sow discord among the revolutionary and progressive forces in the world." After observing that the President dwells on moving from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation, the article says he has kept putting forth "honeyed words" about the socialist countries while "hatching many wicked plots against the socialist camp in particular" and the international communist and workers movement in general. "He remains," it remarks, "the most dangerous enemy of the socialist countries."

Stating that the President's message this year "definitely lacks ostentation and boastfulness," Commentator finds it noteworthy that this year's message does not devote a long chapter to the Nixon Doctrine and "boast" about it as last year's did, instead advancing a thesis on diplomatic philosophy. Commentator recalls that in last year's foreign policy report the President had

* See the TRENDS of 9 February, pages 6-7.

** Hanoi media are not known to have mentioned the President's 10 February press conference in which he made a distinction between his forthcoming Peking and Moscow visits, saying that the former would be more a "dialog" than negotiations.

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"blatantly said" the internal situation of the communist camp constituted one of the four foundations for the birth of the Nixon Doctrine. Citing the President's 6 July speech in Kansas City in which he foresaw a time when five economic superpowers--the United States, West Europe, the USSR, China, and Japan--would determine the world's economic future, the article says "this is obviously a doctrine of big powers deciding the fate of smaller countries, a very obsolete doctrine indeed."

The article indulges in biting invective in stating that through his report "Nixon has proved himself to be one of the worst and most frantic bellicose, anticommunist imperialist aggressors. Through this report, the people of the world can see more clearly the real nature of Nixon--a wicked, blood-thirsty devil and the most dangerous enemy of the peace, national independence, democracy and social progress-loving forces in the world."

Commentator glosses over the President's detailed remarks on efforts to reach a settlement in Vietnam. It says only that "he again dwelt at length on his deceitful eight-point peace plan while he has been rushing more B-52's and aircraft carriers to Vietnam and Indochina." The article concludes that the error of President Nixon's philosophy "and also the aberration of the Nixon Doctrine" consists of "consistently underestimating the revolutionary movement of the world's people, especially the determination of the three Indochinese peoples to fight and to win."

PARIS: DRV, PRG CASTIGATE EIGHT POINTS, PRESS PRG PROPOSAL

Both the DRV and PRG delegates at the Paris session on 10 February continued to press the 2 February elaboration of the "two key points" of the PRG's seven-point proposal and to castigate the President's eight-point peace plan. Hanoi media gave the usual cursory attention to the session, and the VNA account is typically erratic in its reporting of the substance of the communist delegates' statements. For example, VNA notes that DRV representative Nguyen Minh Vy said there is "no significance" in what the Nixon Administration "claimed as new" in the eight points--U.S. withdrawal and South-Vietnamese presidential elections six months after an agreement, with Thieu having resigned five months after the agreement. But VNA omits all of

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PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien's references to the U.S. eight-point proposal, including his remark that "as we have pointed out at the last two sessions and today, the U.S. proposal is only a scheme to hoodwink public opinion."

VNA reports Tien's explanation of why the "two key points" in the PRG's seven-point proposal "are very correct and go to the heart of a peaceful solution." Tien said this is true because the United States' two actions of introducing its own men and equipment into the war and "maintaining" the Thieu administration "are closely related, complement each other, and constitute two aspects of the war."

As usual, VNA's account totally ignores the substance of the allied statements, saying that "the U.S. and Saigon representatives kept clinging to their obstinate stand and even showed an ever more arrogant attitude." VNA does report that the U.S. delegate "absurdly" proposed the postponement of the next session and failed to fix another date, "allegedly" to protest the Versailles assembly. VNA, of course, totally ignores Ambassador Porter's remarks in which he said the eight points were an effort to adapt to the DRV's nine points,* stressed the similarity of the two sides' proposals on such matters as reunification, international guarantees, and settlement of problems among the Indochinese states, and asked why agreement on those issues could not be explored to start a negotiating dialog.

* One of the infrequent references in the propaganda to the nine points appears in a 13 February letter from the NFLSV Central Committee to the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee on the occasion of Tet. As broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 15th, the letter says that the PRG's stand, including the 2 February elaboration, "is fully consistent with the spirit of the DRV Government's nine-point proposal." As in earlier PRG references to the nine points--in the 2 February PRG statement and by Tien at the Paris session on the 3d--there is no mention of the secret U.S.-DRV talks.

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VERSAILLES CONGRESS HAILED; U.S. POSTPONEMENT OF TALKS SCORED

VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS Hanoi gave prompt and substantial publicity to the World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Indochinese Peoples held in Versailles from 11 to 13 February, with Premier Pham Van Dong's greetings to the conclave released on the opening day. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 12th and a NHAN DAN editorial on the 14th welcomed the gathering as strengthening support for the Indochinese struggle. In addition to speeches by the Indochinese delegates, Hanoi carried lengthy accounts of remarks by the U.S. delegation.

In a departure from its past practice with respect to such peace conclaves, Hanoi announced the arrival of its delegate in Paris before the sessions opened. On 9 February VNA reported that the Indochinese delegations had arrived on the 7th--the DRV's led by Hoang Quoc Viet, the NFLSV's by Dang Quang Minh, the Pathet Lao's by General Singkapo Chounlamany, and the RGNUG's by Thiounn Prasith. VNA observed on the 12th that 1,200 delegates from more than 75 countries were present and that the U.S. delegation was "nearly 100 strong."

The tone was set by Premier Pham Van Dong's greetings message, in which he described the conference as "a new manifestation of the ever broader and stronger international support for the hard but certainly victorious struggle of the three Indochinese peoples." Dong repeated the line that the so-called 'eight-point peace plan' disclosed in the President's 25 January speech is an effort to hoodwink public opinion in an election year.

Dong rejected the U.S. plan in standard terms, as designed to pursue Vietnamization, although he did not specify the details of the plan. The resolution adopted by the assembly, on the other hand, explicitly castigated the President's offer of a troop withdrawal and presidential elections in South Vietnam six months after an agreement, with President Thieu having resigned a month before the elections. Dong, in endorsing the PRG position, spelled out in full the 2 February elaboration calling on the United States to set a date for withdrawal and for President Thieu to resign immediately. The premier also duly endorsed peace proposals by the Pathet Lao and Sihanouk's government, and the assembly resolution registered support for the communist stands on settlement in all three Indochinese countries.

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The DRV and PRG delegations in Paris both issued statements on 10 February which "strongly criticized" the U.S. delegation for unilaterally postponing the 17 February session "under the absurd pretext that the Versailles World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Indochinese Peoples is 'incompatible with the purposes of the Paris conference.'" But oddly, while the PRG statement was promptly reported by VNA and by the Hanoi radio and press, the only known Hanoi publicity for the DRV's statement came belatedly in a single broadcast on the 13th.

The PRG statement declared that the postponement "proves that the Nixon Administration does not want to seriously negotiate." It charged that the U.S. Paris delegation, in branding the representatives of more than 80 countries as a "claque" and a "horde of agitators," has "shown an intolerable contemptuous attitude toward peace- and justice-loving opinion the world over" and has demonstrated "U.S. fright in face of the ever stronger world condemnation" of the President for professing to desire peace while prolonging the war and sabotaging the talks.

The DRV statement also saw the postponement as evidence of the Nixon Administration's "fear of public opinion" and asserted that the assembly "is only aimed at voicing the truth" about the war. Unlike the PRG statement, the DRV's recalled the "three unilateral postponements" by the U.S. delegation during December when the Nixon Administration "intensified" the bombing of the North and war activities in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. It asserted that the United States now "repeats this maneuver in the hope of undermining" the talks while intensifying military activities, stepping up Vietnamization, strengthening the air war, sending additional carriers to the Tonkin Gulf, and increasing the number of B-52's in Indochina.

Other Hanoi propaganda scoring the postponement of the Paris session included a Hanoi radio commentary on the 11th on stepped-up U.S. air strikes and military preparation and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 12th pegged to the Versailles gathering. A Hanoi broadcast on the 13th reported that the U.S. delegation at Versailles issued a statement condemning Ambassador Porter's attitude and noted that members of the U.S. delegation and another group from the assembly went to the U.S. Embassy to protest Porter's action.

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MOSCOW Moscow's publicity for the Versailles assembly was highlighted by a message from Brezhnev which conveyed greetings "from the bottom of my heart." He lauded the struggle of the Indochinese peoples for the "immediate and complete" withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops and scored alleged U.S. attempts, through declarations about "winding down" the American military presence, to conceal moves to drag out the bloodshed by Vietnamization. He demanded a "just settlement" in the Indochinese countries, but mentioned no specific peace plan in offering support for the "legitimate demands" of the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian people.

The USSR delegation to the assembly was headed by Petr Pimenov, chairman of the Soviet Committee to Support Vietnam and secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU). The AUCCTU and the Soviet Peace Committee also sent greetings to the assembly. TASS reported the daily sessions and carried interviews with various participants. Routine-level press and radio comment pointed to U.S. discomfiture over the assembly, with some commentators castigating the U.S. Paris delegation for using the assembly as the pretext for calling off the 17 February session of the Paris talks.

A Moscow commentary in Mandarin on the 13th pointed to the failure of Peking to send a delegation to the assembly as further evidence of its "betrayal" of the Vietnamese, and it repeated the charge that the Chinese leadership "has increasingly taken concerted action with the U.S. imperialists." Referring to President Nixon's coming trip to the PRC, the commentary recalled that the President said in a press conference that he would not make any new peace proposal on Indochina and that he "hoped that the Peking leaders would understand his policy." A talk by an Indian journalist, broadcast by Moscow radio on the 12th in English for South Asian listeners, said that the President and Chou now know that any "understanding" they may reach on Indochina "can have no validity" because the world public has endorsed the Vietnamese position "that no settlement behind the back of the peoples will be acceptable."

PEKING Peking's only acknowledgment thus far of the Versailles assembly was a belated 16 February NCNA report summarizing the greetings messages sent by Indochinese leaders and the speeches of the delegates of these countries. Peking's minimal attention to an assembly sponsored by Moscow-oriented Western CP's is consistent with the PRC's normal failure to acknowledge activities of such parties. Peking had acknowledged the Fifth International Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, held in March 1970, with only NCNA and domestic service reports of Sihanouk's greetings message.

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USSR GOVERNMENT BELATEDLY SCORES U.S. PEACE PLAN, BACKS PRG

Belatedly on 11 February, the Soviet Government issued a statement assailing the eight-point U.S. peace plan disclosed by the President on 25 January and backing the 2 February PRG statement that rejected the U.S. plan and "elaborated" on the PRG's own seven points. It also supports the DRV Government statement of 5 February. This is the first such official statement to be issued by the Soviets following a Vietnamese communist peace initiative.* Some two hours before it released the government statement, TASS reported that Kosygin had received the DRV ambassador at the latter's request, noting that "questions of mutual interest" were discussed in an atmosphere of friendship and "comradely frankness," a characterization reflecting failure to achieve an accord.** The TASS report appeared in PRAVDA on the 12th, in the same issue that carried the government statement.

Circuitous language in the government statement seems related to Moscow's effort to tread a tightrope in its propaganda as the dates for President Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow approach. Thus it manages to avoid any mention of the President, stating that "some people" in Washington are trying to replace "quests for a settlement by various political maneuvers aimed at attaining the same goals the U.S. military could not attain on the battlefield."

The statement is also noteworthy for its failure to address itself to the specific points at issue in the rival proposal. It ignores the substance of the U.S. eight points, merely

* Moscow endorsed the PRG's 1 July seven-point proposal with a PRAVDA editorial on the 5th--the day after Peking extended editorial support in PEOPLE'S DAILY. The most recent Soviet Government statement on Indochina was on 30 December 1971, denouncing the U.S. bombing of the DRV.

** An atmosphere of "friendship and cordiality" was said to have marked two previous visits paid Kosygin by the DRV ambassador this month--a courtesy call on 1 February after assuming his post, and a visit accompanying the PRG ambassador on the 4th when the latter formally presented the "elaboration" of the seven points to the Soviet leaders.

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repeating complaints that "Washington" is refusing to set a deadline for total U.S. troop withdrawal and "is trying to make the people of South Vietnam agree to a continued existence of the pro-American puppet regime in Saigon." While some prior routine-level Moscow comment had acknowledged the full content of the PRG's "elaboration" of the seven points, the statement notably ignores the demand for Thieu's resignation, although it mentions the demand that the United States cease its support for the Saigon regime as well as the new call for a deadline for troop withdrawal.

The government statement concludes with a bland generalized expression of "full support" for the "just demands of the Vietnamese people" and a reaffirmation of "firm support" for the struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia against "imperialist aggression."

The Soviet Government statement was preceded on 10 February by a PRAVDA editorial which focused on a reaffirmation of Soviet aid and support for the Indochinese people's struggle and assailed the President's peace plan, but said little about the Vietnamese communist peace programs. Stressing Soviet assistance, it recalled the 26 January statement by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee and observed that the World Assembly on Indochina in Versailles would be a fresh demonstration of international support. The editorial did not acknowledge the substance of the eight points in scoring the President's peace plan for failing to propose an "unconditional" troop withdrawal and an end to the air war, as well as for sustaining U.S. support of the Thieu regime and pursuing the Vietnamization policy. It praised the "constructive programs" for political settlement advanced by the DRV, PRG, NLHS, and FUNK but did not elaborate on their content. It recalled that the "recent" DRV Government statement supported the "well-known PRG seven-point program" but neglected to mention the 2 February PRG statement which "elaborated" on the seven points.

Moscow has given minimal attention to President Nixon's comments on Indochina in his 9 February foreign policy report and at his press conference of the 10th. TASS reported on the 11th that the President said "categorically" at the press conference that the U.S. side would make no new proposals until an answer to the U.S. plan was received and that he expressed "complete support" for the Saigon regime, refusing

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to negotiate with the enemy "in a way that undercuts our ally." A Moscow radio newscast in English on the 11th said that the President "demanded acceptance of American conditions" and "made it clear that the United States rejected" the DRV and PRG peace proposals. A Moscow domestic service commentary the next day added that the President's remarks indicated that the United States intends to continue acting in Vietnam "from a position of strength by methods of gross pressure and open diktat." In a slap at the Chinese, it remarked that one reason for U.S. willingness to thus expose its "aggressive" aspirations was undoubtedly a hope for a "behind-the-scenes diplomatic deal with Peking."

Brief Soviet reports of the comments on Indochina in the foreign policy report acknowledged little of substance when they complained that the President pointed out that American forces would remain in South Vietnam "until the American terms are accepted" and that Washington will continue to support the Saigon regime. A TASS item noted that the report acknowledged that public opinion at home believed the government was not doing all that is necessary to achieve a settlement, but without acknowledging that the context of that remark was a discussion of the secret U.S.-DRV contacts.

A Moscow Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin on the foreign policy report took the opportunity to again attack Peking's Indochina policies, linking the report and the President's eight-point plan with his forthcoming trip to Peking. The President's words about peace, it said, merely camouflage a "preconceived plan" to widen the war. "Observers" agree, it said, that by advancing a "clearly unacceptable" peace proposal and ignoring the DRV and PRG proposals, the United States hopes to place the blame on the Vietnamese for obstructing the search for a peaceful solution. It added that President Nixon's trip to China will culminate a Sino-U.S. rapprochement at a time when the United States has "resumed" bombing of the DRV and is massing aircraft carriers and planning SEATO maneuvers. Repeating charges that the PRC's attitude facilitates U.S. aggression, the commentary recalled that Peking issued its invitation to the President at the time when the PRG was offering its seven-point proposal last summer, thus deflecting public attention from that proposal.

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PEKING DECRIES U.S. "WAR BLACKMAIL," PLEDGES SUPPORT OF WAR

Heightened U.S. air activity in Vietnam and announcements on the deployment of additional aircraft in the region have elicited a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 14 February condemning U.S. "war blackmail" and pledging Chinese support in the anti-U.S. war. Offering another reassurance to their allies a week before President Nixon's arrival in Peking, the Chinese declared that they "will in all circumstances firmly fulfill their proletarian internationalist duty" to support the Indochinese peoples in the war effort. A 12 February NCNA report on the same subject asserted that the United States cannot "alter the determination" of the Chinese to support the Indochinese resistance war.

Both NCNA and the Commentator article interpreted the recent U.S. military moves as demonstrating the fraudulence of Washington's peace initiatives. In Peking's initial comment on President Nixon's 25 January peace proposal, a 29 January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article and a companion NCNA report--reacting to the President's warning that he would take action to protect the remaining American forces if the enemy stepped up military attacks--had denounced U.S. military "blackmail and intimidation." NCNA at that time called this a "provocation" against the Chinese as well as the Indochinese peoples, but this charge has not been repeated in subsequent comment and there has been no reference to Chinese security interests.

Characteristically, Peking's comment has avoided personal abuse of the President, the Commentator article on the 14th mentioning him only in recalling the eight-point peace plan. Peking did publicize tougher language from Hanoi, with NCNA quoting a NHAN DAN commentary on the 12th as assailing "the extremely warlike attitude of the Nixon Administration" and decrying the President's "deceitful tricks and intimidation maneuvers." But in its account of a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 10th discussing the Nixon Administration's practice of negotiation, NCNA omitted a passage pointedly raising the issue of U.S. negotiations with China and the Soviet Union. While quoting NHAN DAN as noting that negotiation is one of the three elements of U.S. global strategy, NCNA ignored a passage which claimed that the United States sought negotiations "especially" with the Soviet Union and China in order to play on their differences and to promote detente among the big powers while cracking down on smaller nations.

Chinese sensitivity to Hanoi's charges that big-power dealings adversely affect its interests was also reflected in NCNA's

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account of a 13 February NHAN DAN Commentator article on President Nixon's foreign policy report. Concentrating mainly on NHAN DAN's discussion of the Indochina question, NCNA omitted a passage quoting the President's July 1971 Kansas City speech in which he discussed five economic superpowers including China, which NHAN DAN characterized as a doctrine of big powers deciding the fate of smaller countries.* NCNA also omitted a reference to the President's "honeyed words" covering "wicked plots" against the communist countries. In what could be read as a message intended for Peking, NHAN DAN said in this connection that the President "remains the most dangerous enemy of the socialist countries."

PLAF ANNIVERSARY Peking used the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the unification of the South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces to reaffirm support for recent communist statements on a Vietnam peace settlement. PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Chang Tsai-chien, speaking at a "report meeting" sponsored by the PRC Ministry of Defense on the 11th, cited the PRC, PRG, and DRV government statements issued this month and the PRG's seven-point proposal of 1 July last year. Though referring to the eight-point proposal advanced by "the U.S. aggressors," Chang did not mention the President. On the same occasion, the PRG ambassador named the President in denouncing his peace plan as serving political needs in the U.S. presidential election--a charge that has not been made by Peking in its own name.

Peking's observance of the PLAF anniversary this year reflected the purge of the Chinese military hierarchy last fall. The customary message from the Chinese defense minister was simply omitted this year. Replacing Politburo member Li Tso-Peng as the ranking leader present at the report meeting was Li Te-sheng, Politburo alternate member and director of the PLA General Political Department. The latter also headed the Chinese representation at a reception given by the PRG ambassador on the 10th. This event last year was attended by Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-peng, and Chiu Hui-tso--all of them military leaders now absent from view.

* Chou En-lai, in his interview with Neville Maxwell published in the London SUNDAY TIMES on 5 December, referred to the speech in discoursing on the world situation today. Chou specifically noted that the President named five superpowers including China.

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SINO-CAMBODIAN AID PACT SIGNED; SIHANOUK ARRIVES IN HANOI

In two developments demonstrating solidarity among Peking and its Indochinese allies prior to President Nixon's arrival in China, the PRC signed an aid agreement with Prince Sihanouk's government (RGNU) on 11 February and the prince departed for Hanoi on the next day. At the same time, Sihanouk's latest message to his compatriots, dated the 11th, cited DRV and PRC expressions of support and quoted the 4 February PRC Government statement as evidence that the President's visit would not deflect Peking from this course.

According to NCNA on the 11th, the agreement signed that day provides for Chinese "economic aid and military supplies to Cambodia for 1972." Together with Sihanouk, RGNU Premier Penn Nouth, and Ieng Sary, "special envoy of the interior part of Cambodia," a high-powered Chinese delegation headed by Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, and Li Hsien-nien attended the signing ceremony. The RGNU and Chinese foreign ministers signed the agreement.

A previous agreement on "gratuitous military aid by China to Cambodia in 1970" had been reported by NCNA on 17 August 1970. With the respective premiers in attendance, PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng and RGNU Minister of Military Equipment and Armament Duong Sam Ol signed that accord. NCNA's announcement had also disclosed that the PRC had given the RGNU a loan in May 1970. There is no available report of any agreement on Chinese aid to the Cambodians for 1971.

SIHANOUK VISIT TO HANOI

In a show of Indochinese solidarity, Sihanouk arrived in Hanoi on the 12th for an "unofficial visit" for the Tet holiday at the invitation of DRV President Ton Duc Thong. Sihanouk was accompanied by Ieng Sary, who has played a prominent coordinating role between the RGNU and its allies since his arrival in Peking from the Cambodian "front lines" last August, having visited the DRV in November and the DPRK in December. The Cambodians were greeted at the airport by a delegation headed by Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh.

Sihanouk had previously visited Hanoi twice since his March 1970 ouster from power--in May-June 1970 and January-February 1971. At the conclusion of the second visit he also had consultations with Laotian Prince Souphanouvong in a "frontier region" of Laos.

Though Sihanouk had previously discussed plans for his current trip with Western correspondents, the first acknowledgments of the visit

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in communist media came in the announcements of his departure from Peking and his arrival in Hanoi. In an interview with Western correspondents on 6 December, Sihanouk said he would be in Hanoi to confer with Indochinese leaders during President Nixon's visit to Peking, though he pointed out that the Hanoi trip had been arranged before the announcement on Peking's invitation to the President. AFP quoted Sihanouk as saying he planned to visit North Vietnam for three weeks until the beginning of March for consultations on the Indochinese military situation with North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, and Pathet Lao leaders. A subsequent AFP dispatch, on 10 February, indicated that there would be bilateral talks in Hanoi and that Sihanouk would also confer with Souphanouvong if military operations in Laos permit the latter to go to Hanoi.

In addition to a demonstration of solidarity at the time of President Nixon's visit to Peking, Sihanouk's trip may give him an opportunity to bolster his authority in the wake of the President's 25 January disclosure of secret DRV-U.S. talks and of reports of feelers between Hanoi and the Phnom Penh regime. On 1 February a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman denied Western reports that Hanoi had made secret contacts with Phnom Penh, and during this period a number of RGNU statements assailed U.S. "diplomatic trickery" and schemes allegedly calling for partition of Cambodia and a settlement between Sihanouk's front and the Phnom Penh regime.*

The implications of President Nixon's disclosure of secret negotiations and of his Peking visit were the subject of Sihanouk's 33d "message to the Khmer nation," dated 11 February and released in summary form by NCNA's domestic service on the 11th and textually by the NCNA international service on the 14th. Gleefully citing reports of consternation in Phnom Penh as a result of the President's disclosure, the message also noted reports that the Phnom Penh regime has turned to the communist countries for help in a difficult situation. In this connection the message cited the "sharp, clear-cut, and explicit" replies of Hanoi and Peking, specifically mentioning the 1 February DRV denial of contacts, Pham Van Dong's 20 November speech in Peking reaffirming recognition of the RGNU as the only legitimate government of Cambodia, and a letter from Chou En-lai to Sihanouk on 13 November offering the same assurance. Conspicuously absent from the message was any reference to the Soviet stand on contacts with Phnom Penh.

* See the TRENDS of 2 February, pages 16-17, and of 9 February, pages 8-9.

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Taking note of speculation that Peking's view on the matter may be changed during President Nixon's visit to China, Sihanouk's message quoted from the 4 February PRC Government statement reaffirming Peking's "unshakable established policy" and "unshirkable internationalist duty" to support the Indochinese war effort. Pointing out that this statement was issued only 17 days before the President's arrival in Peking, the message expressed confidence that "China will maintain, in face of her American guest, a firm attitude of absolute support" of the RGNU, the PRG, the DRV, and the NLHS.

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DRV, PRG SCORE U.S. STRIKES, STEPPED-UP MILITARY PREPARATION

The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 13 February issued a statement charging that from 3 to 11 February the United States sent "many aircraft," including B-52's, "to successively attack a number of populated areas north of the 17th parallel in the demilitarized zone belonging to Vinh Linh area." The spokesman's statement also charged that U.S. planes violated the airspace of Nghe An Province on the 11th and that the armed forces and people of Vinh Linh and Nghe An "appropriately punished the U.S. aggressors, downing two U.S. aircraft." The alleged downings had first been reported on 12 February in a VNA item which referred to U.S. actions on both the 10th and 11th. VNA said aircraft had "repeatedly raided a populated area" in Vinh Linh and encroached upon the airspace of Nghe An and that the inhabitants "shot down two war planes." Hanoi radio claimed on the 16th that two planes had been shot down that day by the armed forces and people of Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh area, bringing the total of downed planes to 3,435. It also claimed that a number of pilots were "annihilated or captured."

In addition to labeling the U.S. strikes "serious war acts," the spokesman on the 13th assailed the recent dispatch of U.S. aircraft carriers to the Tonkin Gulf, the dispatch of "many more" B-52's to increase the bombing of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and "the brazen U.S. threat to use airpower against the DRV." These actions, he said, are further proof of the "stubborn and bellicose" nature of the Nixon Administration and lay "bare" its deceitful peace arguments; remarks of this kind are not normally included in the routine foreign ministry spokesman's statements, although they are a staple of other propaganda. The spokesman concluded by vowing routinely that the Vietnamese will persist in "their anti-U.S. national salvation struggle toward complete victory" and that the United States will be held responsible for any consequences.

In criticizing the U.S. dispatch of additional aircraft carriers to the Tonkin Gulf and of B-52's to Guam and Thailand, the foreign ministry spokesman was echoing earlier propaganda, including a Hanoi radio commentary on the 11th and a NHAN DAN article the next day. The U.S. action was also assailed in another Hanoi radio commentary on the 13th. The commentary on the 11th cited Pentagon press spokesman Friedhiem as confirming that two more aircraft carriers had been sent to the Tonkin Gulf, bringing the total to four. It cited AP for the report that the Constellation had arrived from Hong Kong and "immediately" sent aircraft to carry out air strikes

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against the DRV and Laos. It also noted that the Kitty Hawk was en route from San Diego. Citing Western news sources, the commentary said the United States is preparing to step up military activities in Vietnam and to intensify the air war, possibly including a resumption of bombing of the North. It observed that the United States recently had intensified strikes by B-52's and other aircraft in various areas, especially south of the DMZ and in the highland area.

The radio commentary noted that the stepped-up military activity coincided with the "sabotage" of the Paris conference by the U.S. delegate, who refused to set a date for the next session because of the atmosphere created by the Versailles congress. Both the radio broadcast and the NHAN DAN article on the 12th said that the latest U.S. actions expose the U.S. "so-called eight-point peace plan," and both charged that the President's real aim remains "a military victory."

Hanoi's portrayal of U.S. military actions and "threats" has been accompanied by standard calls for continued vigilance. The radio commentary on the 13th said that the alleged downing of two U.S. planes constituted a "stern warning to Nixon and his lackeys that all their war schemes and acts against the northern part of our country will certainly be smashed." An editorial in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 9th--four days before the spokesman protested strikes between 3 and 11 February--urged heightened vigilance. It claimed that along with routine air strikes and shelling by ships and artillery, the United States and its "henchmen" have "actively stepped-up intelligence and ranger activities with a view to disturbing our great rear base."*

In addition to urging "readiness to fight well" at such key points as along the borders, the demarcation line, coastal areas and major communication lines, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said that in those provinces in Military Region IV, just above the DMZ, "proper consideration should be attached to defense of key positions far inside the territory, such as cities, industrial zones, agencies and important factories." It urged them to have prepared plans

* U.S. action against the DRV between 23 January and 1 February had prompted the last previous DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements--on 31 January and 2 February. On 27 January there were editorials on vigilance in NHAN DAN as well as QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, with the latter at that time also warning against actions of rangers and spies.

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not only to "smash" the U.S. air force but also to "guard against the enemy's intelligence, ranger, and psywar activities." And it called upon self-defense units to shoot down low-flying planes and helicopters, "sink or hit enemy ships and landing craft, and not let any pilot or ranger escape."

The editorial did not recall the VPA High Command's order on vigilance and combat-readiness issued on 28 December during the sustained, heavy U.S. air strikes against the North. But the 11 February radio commentary mentioned the order, without citing its date, claiming that it was being "strictly implemented"; and the Hanoi radio report of the downing of two more planes on the 16th described the action as "strict execution" of the VPA order.

PRG SPOKESMAN On 14 February, the day after the DRV protest,
ON AIR STRIKES the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman issued a
 statement condemning the United States for
making "intensive" B-52 attacks on South Vietnam while at the
same time "sending many planes to attack populated areas in DRV
territory." The spokesman said that on the 12th and 13th the
United States sent "many B-52's to stage the biggest bombings in
two years on populated areas in Thua Thien, Kontum, and Gia Lai
provinces and elsewhere." The spokesman echoed Hanoi propaganda in
citing the coincidence of the heavy strikes with the postponement
of the Paris session, and he reiterated Vietnamese determination to
continue the struggle until complete victory.

NORTH, SOUTH VIETNAM MARK LUNAR NEW YEAR, PLAF ANNIVERSARY

NFLSV/PRG NEW The annual message from the PRG and NFLSV on
YEARS MESSAGE the occasion of the lunar new year (Tet) is
 longer than last year's and much more
ebullient, with calls for greater victories and references to
"uprisings" in the South. Last year's more reserved message did
not suggest any new peaks in the combat in calling for persistence
in the struggle.

The current message, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 14th, hails the past year's achievements and calls upon the people to strive for "new victories greater than last year's." Offering a standard evaluation of events last year, the message maintains that the United States tried to score a decisive victory for Vietnamization but that the year proved, on the contrary, to be "disastrous" for implementation of the Vietnamization policy.

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Calling upon "compatriots, cadres, and fighters" to bring about greater victories, the message goes on also to urge those in the cities to press demands for the "immediate" withdrawal of U.S. troops and for Thieu's resignation. The "rural, delta, and mountain" compatriots are asked to "raise aloft the historic tradition of concerted uprising," stepping up their various struggles and "assembling more of their forces to rise up with the mettle of the three-front attack to shatter the enemy's coercive system and liberate the countryside."

The message routinely denounces President Nixon's eight points and reiterates the communist demand for a "positive response" to the PRG's 1 July seven-point plan and its elaboration of 2 February. It also recalls the PRG's 25 January statement of 10 policies on the treatment of defectors from the Saigon government or army.

DRV LEADERS' On 15 February VNA reported the annual Tet visits
TET ACTIVITIES customarily made by the DRV leadership.*
President Ton Duc Thang reportedly paid "new year visits" to the PRG special representation, the cadres and combatants of the Hanoi people's army command, and a worker family in Hanoi. At the PRG office, he "reiterated the Vietnamese people's resolve to liberate the South, defend the North, and proceed to the reunification of the country, whatever barbarous acts of war or sinister schemes the U.S. aggressors may resort to."

The same report said that Le Duan, Vo Nguyen Giap, Le Thanh Nghi and "other party and state leaders made 'spring outings' to several places in and around Hanoi." Earlier on the 14th, Hanoi radio reported the usual meeting held to greet the new year by the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee, noting that Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh, and Hoang Van Hoan attended. And Le Duan and Le Duc Tho** "had cordial talks with retired activists," according to VNA on the 14th.

PLAF ANNIVERSARY DRV Defense Minister Giap greeted both the PLAF's 11th anniversary (15 February) and Tet in a 12 February message, carried by VNA the next day, which acclaimed the "favorable situation" of "our people's fight" and

* Tet visits to various localities and army units were reportedly made last year by Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Vo Nguyen Giap, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Hoang Van Hoan. See the 3 February 1971 TRENDS, page 12.

** Le Duc Tho's last previous publicized appearance was on 1 January of this year during the visit of a French Communist Party delegation led by Rene Piquet.

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scored the Nixon Administration for "speaking of peace" while in practice stepping up the war in the South and continuing "criminal war acts" against the North.

A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 14th marked the PLAF anniversary with praise for the "tremendous victories" of the southern forces which, it said, have caused the allies to sink deeper into a defensive and passive position, have dealt "painful blows" at Vietnamization, and have "created new favorable conditions for the southern revolutionary movement to develop vigorously and steadily." The editorial predicted "greater victories in the near future" and asserted that the PLAF is "valiantly advancing to launch vigorous, constant, and simultaneous attacks" and to deal the allies "serious punishing blows in all three strategic areas."

In South Vietnam the PLAF anniversary was celebrated with a meeting held in "a liberated area," addressed by a PRG and a PLAF representative. Liberation Radio's 16 February account of the meeting is not available in translation at this writing.

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USSR, PRC AND EUROPE

SOVIET JOURNAL ATTACKS PRC'S "ANTI-DETENTE" POLICY IN EUROPE

A lengthy article in the February issue of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN by V. Pavlov, entitled "Europe in Peking's Plans," adds another dimension to the USSR's intensified propaganda attack against the PRC's "anti-detente" policy on the eve of President Nixon's trip to Peking.* Signed to the press on 21 January, the article was summarized by TASS on 5 February and has been broadcast in installments by Radio Moscow since the 10th in scattered foreign languages, including Vietnamese, Romanian, and Mandarin.

The article traces in detail what it depicts as the evolution of Chinese policy on major issues facing Europe, such as European security and the role of the Common Market, and in the process pulls together charges against the Chinese that have been aired piecemeal and sporadically over the years in Soviet media. It appears on the heels of low-keyed Soviet censure of the Chinese posture toward detente in Europe, exemplified in the 3 February PRAVDA editorial's passing complaint that "the Peking leadership . . . has essentially alined itself with the forces impeding the detente process in Europe."

Against this background, Moscow media picked up Premier Chou En-lai's remarks to a member of a visiting French parliamentary delegation on a European security conference: A PRAVDA international review article on 13 February, citing an AFP report of the 9th, said Chou indicated that a European security conference "disturbs China." The article went on to observe

* A stepped-up volume of Soviet propaganda on China currently consists largely of replays of anti-Peking polemics emanating from Moscow's East European allies. For example, on the 14th Radio Moscow made use of comment from Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU, Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG, and East Berlin's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND to make the point that while Peking is "collaborating" with the United States it is intensifying its "subversive" activities against the national liberation movement. An effort in original Soviet comment to discredit Peking and to link the President's PRC visit with internal Chinese dissension came in a Slavin dispatch from Singapore, publicized in PRAVDA on the 11th, which alleged that "since Peking has started courting the imperialist countries," the "tide of refugees fleeing China has mounted."

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that "such a statement will be greeted by ovations from the West German revanchists and NATO ringleaders, from the Greek junta and the Italian neofascists who thus acquire allies in the Far East; again the Peking rulers are closing ranks with the most shameless reaction." PRAVDA did not go on to note that Chou had voiced concern that detente in Europe would allow the USSR to mass more troops on the border with China.

THE PAVLOV ARTICLE'S CASE AGAINST PEKING The Pavlov article asserts that Europe is looming "increasingly large in Peking's subversive, splittist, and adventurist foreign policy" and declares that "the Maoists are attempting in every way to impede detente and the development of equal cooperation" among European countries. The author then proceeds to document his case, pinpointing shifts in China's position "in European security matters." In the 1950's, he says, the PRC expressed solidarity with the initiatives on Europe of the USSR and the other socialist countries. But the PRC backed off in the early 1960's to embark on "its own special line," according to Pavlov, and by the mid-1960's it had adopted "a sharply negative position."

Citing the Chinese press and official spokesmen, the article notes that the PRC has charged that the USSR, in calling for European security, concluding a treaty with the West Germans, and participating in the four-power accord on Berlin, has sought to maintain the status quo in Europe and betrayed the interests of the peoples of Europe. On the matter of a European security conference, Pavlov recalls that PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien in 1969 called the proposed conference an attempt "to 'share a sphere of influence with U.S. imperialism and control and enslave Eastern Europe.'" This interpretation, Pavlov observes, "persists to this very day" in Peking, where through "backstage machinations" the Chinese leadership "is attempting to sow doubts regarding the advisability and potential of a conference, hinting that the conditions for it are not yet ripe."

The Pavlov article goes on to assert that Peking, in addition to its "propaganda outbursts against any efforts in the sphere of a European settlement," is promoting trends in the policies of European countries whose development will ultimately, in the PRC's view, "cement the division of the continent into military-political blocs." On this score, Pavlov takes Peking to task for propagating--"in unison with the United States"--

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the idea of Western Europe as a "third power," a concept in harmony with the PRC doctrine of struggling against the monopoly of "the two superpowers." Pavlov also points out that since October 1970 Peking has established diplomatic relations with five more NATO countries, giving "extremely scrupulous consideration" to the attitude of these countries toward European security. And he decries Peking's encouragement of "micro-European associations" such as a "Mediterranean alliance" and a "Balkan bloc." Regarding the Balkans, Pavlov quotes from an article in the 20 August 1971 edition of the East German BERLINER ZEITUNG warning of Peking's activities there which "serve the objective of knocking together . . . a bloc opposed to the socialist countries."*

Elaborating on the notion of Europe as a "third power," Pavlov deals at length with the PRC's attitude toward the Common Market, "this international association of monopoly capital." As in his treatment of Peking's position on the European security issue, Pavlov chronicles the history of the Chinese view of the Market. It is clear from Chinese articles, he asserts, that the Maoists now regard the unification "of the large-scale monopolies around the Common Market as a force to counterpose the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and a lever with whose aid the struggle to improve the atmosphere in Europe and throughout the world may be undermined." Pavlov concludes that Peking's encouragement of the Market--including its possible involvement into a nuclear force--proves that the PRC is on the side of "the champions of notorious 'Atlantism,' whose horizons are restricted by the limits imposed by blocs."

* The BERLINER ZEITUNG article quoted by Pavlov appeared at the time of a propaganda campaign by Moscow's hardlining East European allies against a possible Belgrade-Tirana-Bucharest-Peking "axis" and on the eve of a visit by a high-ranking Chinese military delegation to Bucharest. See the TRENDS of 18 August 1971, pages 33-39, and 1 September 1971, pages 20-21.

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PEKING ENCOURAGES GROWING INDEPENDENCE FROM SUPERPOWERS

The Pavlov case against Peking's policy on Europe reflects in a tendentious way the changing Chinese approach to this area as part of a more differentiated and flexible global strategy. From the Peking perspective, this approach has accented the positive by focusing on the growth of forces that provide a counterweight to superpower domination while muting opposition to moves contributing to European detente. Thus, apart from occasional barbs directed at Moscow for its "sellout" of East German interests on the Berlin and German questions, Peking has largely avoided direct comment on European security questions. The issues raised in Chou En-lai's remarks to the French parliamentarians, which were not reported in PRC media, have not figured in Peking's recent comment relating to Europe.

The evolution in Peking's approach can be seen in its behavior during a succession of visits by Romanian delegations in recent years. Where Peking previously had taken a hard line on European security issues during Romanian visits in 1970, these issues were discreetly sidestepped at the time of Ceausescu's visit last June. As this example suggests, Peking's purpose has been to encourage trends in Europe toward independence of the superpowers while avoiding antagonizing those of its friends having their own interests in European detente.

COMMENT ON
COMMON MARKET Reflecting its interest in expanding its leverage abroad and capitalizing on trends favorable to its rivalry with the two superpowers, Peking has increasingly played up the development of West European nations into a more closely unified force capable of challenging Soviet and American dominance in Europe. Chinese comment has directed favorable attention to the trend toward broader representation within the European Communities, encouraging the Common Market states to heighten coordination not only in economic matter but also in political and foreign affairs.

Underlining Peking's more positive approach, NCNA's detailed and favorable account on 26 January of the entry of Britain and three other nations into the Common Market demonstrated several departures from Peking's previous assessments of Common Market developments. Where Peking had previously focused on persisting conflicts of interest among West European states as evidence of the overall decline of the world capitalist system, the 26 January NENA account took the line that pressures from the Soviet Union and the United States have caused a "realignment" among European capitalist

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states, forcing them to put aside differences in order to defend mutual interests against outside dominance. Peking had habitually depicted the Common Market as a tool of oppression against the European working class by capitalist rulers, but the NCNA report all but ignored this ideological theme.

Reflecting a reduced concern over the United States as a threat to the PRC's international positions and an interest in checking Soviet influence, Peking has shifted from its former portrayal of West European unity as directed chiefly against Washington and has lauded the virtues of unity vis-a-vis both the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus, while citing Britain's entry into the Common Market as signaling the end of the British-U.S. "special relationship" and marking the further decline of U.S. influence abroad, Chinese comment has taken care to remind the Europeans that Soviet pressure becomes an increasing concern as the U.S. presence declines.

Viewing political consolidation as an effective counterweight to Soviet and American influence, the 26 January NCNA account pointedly quoted statements by European spokesmen such as Chancellor Brandt and Common Market President Malfatti calling for closer political as well as economic ties within the group. The account indicated that the planned Common Market summit conference for this year will be significant for future coordination in political and foreign affairs. By highlighting the remarks of a Luxembourg official voicing approval of Britain's entry and calling for wider EEC ties with British Commonwealth states, NCNA also signaled a departure from past Chinese comment that seemed to prefer a limited, European membership.

CHINESE COMMENT ATTACKS U.K. ON NORTHERN IRELAND, SOUTH ASIA

While strongly welcoming London's entry into the Common Market as a sign of British independence of U.S. influence, Peking has shown a readiness to take issue with London on other matters that may reflect Chinese displeasure over the British stand on Taiwan. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 8 February, Peking's most authoritative comment on the Northern Ireland troubles, went significantly beyond earlier comment that had interpreted the Northern Ireland question as a class issue stemming from oppression of the working classes by "reactionary authorities." Commentator defined the issue instead as a "national question" and pointedly expressed Chinese support for the "national independence" of the people of Northern Ireland.

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In addition to this unprecedented endorsement of separatist claims in Northern Ireland, the article also hinted at Chinese support for accession of the region to the Irish Republic. Commentator made a point of noting that although Ireland had become free from British control when it proclaimed its separation from the Commonwealth in 1948, London had "refused to incorporate the six northern counties into the republic" and had "continued its rule over the Northern Irish people."

After dwelling on British "hypocrisy" in the handling of this issue, Commentator went on to make Peking's first direct charge against the British position in the recent Indo-Pakistani war, stating that London "took sides" with the Indian "expansionists" who have "dismembered Pakistan." The article concluded by reiterating opposition to Britain's present efforts to come to terms with the Smith government of Rhodesia.

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MOSCOW PLAYS DOWN PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow has reacted cautiously to President Nixon's third report on U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's, released 9 February, chiefly with routine-level radio comment for scattered foreign audiences and publicity for critical foreign reaction. While this low-level response may be of a time-marking nature, pending a more authoritative appraisal in the central press, it accords with Soviet media's treatment of last year's report. The first such document, in 1970, had occasioned an article in IZVESTIYA by the paper's authoritative commentator Matveyev two days after its release.

The initial 9 February TASS account of the President's report portrayed it disparagingly as an election gambit calculated to cast Administration policies "in a good light." TASS' highly selective reportage of the content of the document and the nature of TASS' editorial interjections reflected areas of Soviet concern. Thus Moscow's sensitivity over the triangular aspects of the President's visit to Peking was mirrored in TASS' statement that "Nixon admitted that certain political circles in the United States were exerting pressure to utilize the new approach to Peking for exploiting the Sino-Soviet tension." In this context, TASS went on to quote the President's statement that U.S. policy was not directed against the Soviet Union, as well as his observation that both the United States and the USSR should resolve problems of prime importance and that it would be costly to let antagonisms impede progress.

Singling out other comments on U.S.-Soviet relations, in the foreign policy report, TASS said the President observed that "problems separating the USSR and the United States are serious ones . . . involving the security and welfare of both countries and therefore require concrete agreements on specific questions that cause tensions." Noting that Mr. Nixon said a threat to peace existed in the Middle East, TASS added that while listing the measures that should be taken to ease tension, he "again declared for increasing the delivery of offensive weapons to Israel, thereby encouraging its aggressive policy." Predictably, TASS did not address itself to the President's statement that Moscow is using

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the Middle East conflict to perpetuate its military presence in Egypt and is injecting the global military rivalry into the region.*

The TASS account also ignored the President's expression of concern over the USSR's nuclear buildup, its expanding military presence in the Mediterranean and other areas, and its recent stand in the Indian-Pakistani war. TASS' summing-up of the foreign policy report played the stock theme on the disparity between U.S. words and deeds: While the President "contended that U.S. might is indispensable in pursuing foreign policy . . . the report says the United States is striving to pass from an era of confrontation to an era of talks."

On the 11th PRAVDA carried a TASS roundup of foreign reaction to the President's report under the heading "Counting on the Policy of Force." Typical of the contents was a passage citing the Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU's appraisal of the document as "a call to build the U.S. military arsenal motivated by an imaginary threat from the Soviet Union." The Polish paper was quoted as saying such a stress was essential to the White House "in order to appeal for the maintenance of 'Atlantic cohesion' under conditions where there is no longer 'automatic unity' in NATO."

A PRAVDA international-review article by Yermakov on the 13th, largely devoted to attacking U.S. Vietnam policy, used comment drawn selectively from the Western press to criticize the President's report. Noting that "many observers are alarmed by the message's deliberate toughness, by its fanning of the arms race, and by its aspirations to domination," Yermakov went on to quote the French communist L'HUMANITE to the effect that the document represents "an attempt to adapt U.S. interference in other people's affairs better to present U.S. capabilities."

STRATEGIC ARMS Playing the words-versus-deeds theme, Yermakov commented that "U.S. allocations for the development of strategic weapons--which the New York TIMES says are openly presented as a means of pressure on Moscow--cannot, of course, improve the international atmosphere and instill trust in the words about peace and cooperation

* See the Middle East section of this TRENDS for a fuller discussion of Moscow's reaction to the President's remarks on the area.

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with which the message abounds." On the same day, a participant in the domestic service commentators' roundtable observed with respect to the foreign policy report that it is difficult "to reconcile statements about striving to achieve a curtailment of the programs for production of weapons, including missiles, and a further increase in appropriations for the arms race."

In keeping with its continuing low-keyed criticism of what it views as U.S. efforts to escalate the arms race, Moscow promptly picked up in that context the annual defense message sent to Congress by Secretary Laird on 15 February. TASS on that day cited the message as evidence that Washington will move ahead with "its policy of escalating the arms race, sustaining hotbeds of tension in the world, and overstraining the U.S. economy." Ignoring the assessments in Laird's message of relative U.S. and Soviet missile strength, TASS said the message indicated that the United States in FY 1973 would increase its spending on strategic nuclear forces, with emphasis on sea-based missiles, and would expand the Safeguard ABM system, develop a strategic bomber, and modernize the armed forces as a whole.

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K O R E A

KIM IL-SONG ELABORATES ON PEACE PACT PROPOSAL, UN STAND

Kim Il-song elaborated on his seemingly ambiguous proposal on a "peace pact" between North and South Korea in an 11 January interview with a visiting Japan Socialist Party (JSP) official, making it clear that the pact could be concluded before the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.* Kim also appeared to moderate Pyongyang's stand on the United Nations, doing so in a manner suggesting that the change is related to the seating of the PRC in the UN. Kim's effort to project a more flexible position on these issues may be intended to capitalize on hopes aroused by the Korean Red Cross talks and to contrast a conciliatory Pyongyang approach with ROK President Pak Chong-hui's 6 December declaration of a state of emergency. Pyongyang is also presumably seeking to adjust to the new atmosphere arising out of Sino-U.S. developments.

PEACE PACT The 11 January interview with the JSP official was not published in that party's organ, SHAKAI SHIMPO, until 26 January. It is not clear what was behind the delay in publication, though it may relate to the travels of the JSP official or his colleagues (a JSP delegation departed for home from Peking on 13 January). According to the JSP paper, Kim specifically explained that his current proposal differs from past North Korean proposals on a peace pact in that previously a U.S. troop withdrawal was made a condition for the peace pact but that "this time, however, we propose an immediate peace agreement, and a renunciation of the use of armed force, and after that mutual reduction of armed forces, under the condition that the U.S. forces withdraw."

* In a January interview with the Japanese paper YOMIURI he had seemed to be deliberately vague on this point. According to the English translation provided by KCNA on the 15th, he said that "a peace agreement should be concluded between the North and the South and the armed forces of North and South Korea be cut drastically under the condition that the U.S. imperialist aggressor troops are withdrawn from South Korea." This formulation, by virtue of its ambiguity, seemed more flexible than past North Korean proposals on a peace pact, which emphasized that a U.S. withdrawal from South Korea was a prior condition. See the 19 January TRENDS, pages 26-28.

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Kim's clarification has not been carried in Pyongyang media, but a NODONG SINMUN article on the initial proposal, reported by KCNA in English on 8 February, also made it clear that the peace pact could precede a U.S. troop withdrawal:

If a peace agreement is concluded between the North and South, the freeze will be removed and a state of war will be brought to an end in Korea and an atmosphere of trust and understanding between North and South be created, and there will be no reason whatsoever for foreign troops to stay on in South Korea any longer.

The initial proposal had received considerable propaganda followup from Pyongyang, including a NODONG SINMUN editorial on 18 January, and statements of support from the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland and the youth organization. DPRK diplomatic envoys had also publicized the interview in press conferences held in various foreign capitals, including Moscow and Peking.

Both the PRC and USSR have expressed support for the proposal, the Soviet Union with routine-level comment and the PRC with a 29 January PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. Both Moscow and Peking, in reporting Kim's original proposal, had quoted him in such a way as to indicate that the peace pact could precede the U.S. troop withdrawal. For example, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, as translated into English by NCNA, cited Kim as having proposed "a peace agreement between North and South Korea and, under the condition of withdrawal of the U.S. imperialist aggressor troops from South Korea, a drastic cut of the armed forces of both North and South Korea."

UNITED NATIONS In his interview with the JSP official, Kim seemed to exhibit some new flexibility in North Korea's stand in the United Nations in the wake of the seating of the PRC. After pointing out that in this situation ROK President Pak may have to give up his idea of UN-supervised elections in Korea, Kim reiterated the stock demand that the United Nations "must rescind the unjust resolutions it adopted against the DPRK." But he left some room for flexibility in adding that "we are now in the midst of discussing the question of the United Nations and we have not yet decided on our final policy," while going on to repeat demands that "as the first step" the UN must rescind its "unjust resolutions" against Korea and the U.S. forces must be withdrawn.

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In his YOMIURI interview Kim used a formulation suggesting that Pyongyang would accept something less than a formal revocation of the UN resolutions. Kim said the UN should revoke all the resolutions on the Korean question "illegally concocted" by the United States, "or it also might adopt a just policy toward Korea, thereby rendering previous illegal resolutions void." Kim may have in mind Peking's willingness to ignore past UN resolutions branding the Chinese communists as aggressors in the Korean War, a stigma which did not deter the PRC from entering the world body.

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MIDDLE EAST

PRAVDA OBSERVER SKEPTICAL OF U.S. "MEDIATION," INDIRECT TALKS

Moscow offers only minimal comment on the Middle East section of President Nixon's foreign policy report and continues to hold propaganda on the Middle East problem to a low volume. High-level comment does come, however, in the form of a 12 February PRAVDA Observer article underlining Egyptian initiatives for a settlement, accusing Israel and the United States of delaying a solution, and decrying U.S. efforts for interim talks on a Suez Canal settlement.* Observer also defensively rebuts "slanders" about Soviet-Egyptian relations and the results of as-Sadat's talks in Moscow. And Kosygin, speaking at a luncheon for a visiting Iraqi delegation on the 11th, said the as-Sadat talks would greatly contribute to establishing a just peace.

PRAVDA OBSERVER The 12 February PRAVDA Observer article sets out
ON CANAL TALKS Soviet objections to interim talks on a Suez
Canal settlement when it decries the United
States' "self-styled mediation" in the Middle East and questions
the value of Israel's agreement to start "indirect talks" with
Cairo when Tel Aviv has not relinquished its territorial demands.
Notably, Observer mentions the Jarring mission only in passing and,
while drawing on other elements of the recent Soviet-Egyptian
communique, fails to repeat its stress on immediate resumption of
Jarring's efforts. Other comment does, however, assert the need
to resume the mission while charging Israel with trying to obstruct
it and the United States with trying to replace it with American
mediation. TASS on the 10th noted that UN Secretary General Waldheim
had said he was very much interested in continuation of the Jarring
mission.

The Observer article accuses Washington of maneuvering to create
the impression that as a result of U.S. moves, restoration of
peace in the Middle East is slowly coming closer to achievement.
Even new U.S. military assistance to Israel, Observer adds, has
been portrayed by "American propaganda" as part of this mediating
activity with the claim that when Israel feels strong enough it
will proceed to fulfill Security Council Resolution 242 providing

* Previous PRAVDA Observer articles on the Middle East--on 30 April
and 2 October 1969--are discussed in the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST
BLOC BROADCASTS of 8 May 1969, pages 10-16, and the TRENDS of
8 October 1969, pages 22-23.

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for return of the occupied territories to the Arabs. But in light of "frank revelations" by Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir on retention of certain territories, Observer wonders what the value is of reports in Washington of Israeli agreement to start indirect talks with Cairo through a high-ranking State Department official. In view of Tel Aviv's seeming reliance on this procedure to present its territorial demands to Egypt, Observer adds, it is not surprising that Egypt recently announced rejection of the idea of "so-called 'indirect talks.'"

Although Observer mentions Egyptian rejection of indirect talks, Moscow still stops short of such rejection on its own authority. A Baryshev article in the 11 February SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, referring to the U.S. offer to organize New York hotel talks between Egypt and Israel with "impartial" U.S. participation, did call this a "deliberately unacceptable proposal." But Baryshev twice referred to the New York talks not as "indirect talks" but as "direct contacts," a concept Moscow has long dismissed while Israel occupies Arab territories. Thus Baryshev wondered what sort of "direct contacts" between Egypt and Israel could be considered when the latter refused to accept UN decisions and continued its occupation of Arab lands. In the same vein, a Koryavin article in the 8 February IZVESTIYA took Secretary Rogers to task for saying he saw no reason why parallel negotiations should not be conducted under U.S. aegis. The difference, Koryavin explained, is that Jarring's mission brings "constructive steps" for a solution while the American proposals do not envisage "precise measures for the main condition of a settlement"--Israeli withdrawal.

Primakov also brought up the subject of indirect talks in the 13 February Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable. Outlining Egyptian and Israeli positions in connection with a reopening of the Suez Canal, Primakov remarked that American papers say "some kind of variant of talks" has been readied in which representatives of Egypt and Israel could be housed in the same New York hotel or neighboring hotels, with American officials "scurrying between the hotel rooms." Primakov did not dismiss the idea out of hand, merely going on to say that regardless of the form of contacts planned by the United States, it is engaged in "purely political maneuvers," and he suggested that the new mediatory efforts were calculated to divert Arab indignation at U.S. supply of Phantoms to Israel.

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SOVIET-EGYPTIAN
RELATIONS

The PRAVDA Observer article seems concerned to counter speculation on the results of as-Sadat's recent visit to Moscow as well as on difficulties the Egyptian president is encountering on the domestic front. Thus it accuses Israel of attempting to "undermine the progressive regimes in the Arab countries from within and to alter their political orientation." Declaring that the Arab countries cannot watch such intrigues with indifference, Observer says the Egyptian Government is implementing a series of measures to strengthen the domestic front. The article denounces what it calls Zionist, Israeli, and reactionary propaganda attempts to sow Arab mistrust of the Soviet Union, and it rejects "conjecture and slander" from the "reactionary press" in connection with as-Sadat's Moscow visit, while praising the "fine tradition" of regular meetings and talks between Soviet and Egyptian leaders and the "fruitful results" of the recent consultations.

Taking a different tack, a Primakov remark in the 13 February commentators' roundtable also seems to suggest Soviet sensitivity on the matter of relations with Egypt. According to Primakov, the Western press attempted to reduce the as-Sadat visit "to the level of an ordinary, everyday event," which he called a hasty conclusion.

Entertaining an Iraqi party-government delegation led by Saddam Husayn, Kosygin declared in a luncheon speech on the 11th that the as-Sadat talks would greatly contribute to achieving the goals of eliminating the consequences of "Israeli aggression" and establishing a just peace. (Despite Iraqi rejection of a political settlement, Kosygin did refer to Israeli refusal to comply with demands for a just settlement in accordance with Security Council and UNGA resolutions. He also pledged "all-out" political and economic support for the Arabs, but only "effective assistance" in strengthening their defense capability.)

NIXON FOREIGN
POLICY REPORT

Soviet media have offered little comment on the Middle East portion of the foreign policy report released on the 9th. A broadcast in English that day claimed that the Middle East section was written "entirely from pro-Israeli positions," and an Arabic-language commentary the same day opened with the observation that the President completely evaded the "main issue," withdrawal of Israeli forces. Later accounts briefly noted that the President again called for increased shipments of offensive weapons to Israel, thereby

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encouraging Israel's "aggressive policy." Moscow has cited Egyptian Premier 'Aziz Sidqi as criticizing the message, and Matveyev, participating in the domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 13th, said Cairo press criticism of the Middle East section is "very sharp and quite justified." The President, he added, resorted to unveiled threats against the Arab countries and "connected these threats" to NATO actions in the Mediterranean basin.

A Moscow domestic service commentary by Viktor Aleksandrov on the 10th charged that the report contained no positive points which would testify to Washington's intention to renounce its "unlimited support" for Israel and contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East. He claimed that analysis of the report showed that the United States' main attention is concentrated on increasing deliveries of offensive weapons to Israel "allegedly" to preserve the military balance. The second direction of U.S. efforts is to further achievement of an agreement on opening the Suez Canal, Aleksandrov said. He objected that Washington and Tel Aviv have tried to thwart Egyptian initiative on this question as well as to freeze the Jarring mission and paralyze the four-power consultations on the Middle East in the United Nations.

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GREECE AND CYPRUS

SOVIET UNION FORMALLY PROTESTS U.S. HOME PORTS IN GREECE

TASS on 15 February carries a statement for the press which summarizes Moscow's first formal objections to "the planned establishment of bases" for the U.S. Sixth Fleet on Greek territory. According to the document, the complaints were registered in the form of Soviet Government statements to the United States and Greece by the USSR's ambassadors in Washington and Athens.* U.S. press reports that American-Greek talks on home-porting arrangements would start soon were promptly noted by TASS on 24 January and subsequent routine comment by Soviet media has criticized the idea as aimed at expanding the permanent U.S. military presence in the eastern Mediterranean. TASS on 8 February reported State Department spokesman Bray as announcing that an "agreement 'in principle'" had been concluded between Greece and the United States several days earlier on what TASS called "the buildup of a permanent base for the American Sixth Fleet in the Greek port of Piraeus."

TASS says that the Greek Government's "attention was drawn" to the fact that establishment of "such bases" was a dangerous step "fraught with serious complications" in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. But it goes no further than to say that the Warsaw Pact countries "cannot but draw appropriate conclusions for their security" in connection with actions of those forces interested in maintaining tension, setting some European states at loggerheads with others, and aggravating developments in Europe.

* The U.S.-Bahraini stationing agreement, signed in late December and reported by the U.S. press in early January, has drawn only minimal propaganda attention from Moscow. Comment has linked it with the "U.S. military presence" in the Indian Ocean evidenced by American "gunboat diplomacy" in the Bay of Bengal during the Indian-Pakistani conflict. Moscow has described the former British facilities on Bahrain as part of an "extensive network" of imperialist bases in the area, including the "large military base" on Diego Garcia. The latter installation has periodically been a subject of routine propaganda criticism when the project has been topical in the U.S. and British press.

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The statement made to the U.S. Government, TASS says, also stresses that implementation of these intentions would be a step toward aggravating tension in Europe. The statement goes on to caution that such U.S. actions "naturally cannot but evoke a corresponding reaction from the USSR," the more so since the matter concerns establishment of "new naval bases" in direct proximity to the frontiers of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The long-standing "proximity" formula does not this time include a reference to Soviet security (although the statement to Greece does refer to the security of the Pact countries). As long ago as April 1955, a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement had said that the setting up of foreign military bases in countries of the Near and Middle East was "directly related to the security of the USSR," and went on to note that the USSR was situated in the immediate vicinity of these countries. The most recent such assertion at the elite level appears to be Gromyko's remark, in his 3 October 1968 UNGA address, that the Soviet Union was ready to assist in implementation of an Egyptian proposal to restore peace in the Middle East, "which borders on our southern frontiers and whose stability directly affects the Soviet Union's security."

Variations on the "appropriate conclusions" and "corresponding reaction" phraseology appeared in propaganda in the mid-1960's on the NATO multilateral nuclear force concept. These ranged from cautionary remarks that the Warsaw Pact countries would "draw appropriate conclusions and take appropriate measures" to warnings that they would take the "necessary defensive measures" or "corresponding measures." Currently, a 9 February KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article on European security, noting the "significant new increase in military expenditures" in the next U.S. budget as well as U.S. demands for larger military contributions from its NATO allies, declares that the Pact states cannot fail to "draw the appropriate conclusions from this for their own security."

Moscow from time to time denies that the USSR has military bases in the Mediterranean. Thus a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article last July by two Soviet captains asked if it were easy for a military body, particularly a naval one, to function normally far from its bases of supply, repair, and other services. Adding that "the answer is obvious," the article called it also obvious that unlike the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the Soviet squadron has no military bases in the Mediterranean countries. Precisely the same statement appeared in articles by the same authors in the 9 February PRAVDA UKRAINY and SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA.

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MOSCOW DENOUNCES GREEK "ULTIMATUM" TO CYPRUS, SEES NATO PLOT

A flurry of Moscow propaganda exploits the strained relations between Cyprus and Greece which culminated in the Greek Government's 11 February note to President Makarios calling, among other things, for the formation of a government of "national unity" and the handing over of recently imported arms, reportedly from Czechoslovakia, to the Greek-officered National Guard or to the UN Peace Force. Soviet media promptly use the occasion to reiterate standard charges that the Greek regime, with the blessing and support of NATO and the Pentagon, is attempting to effect enosis (Cyprus' union with Greece), double enosis (division of the island between Greece and Turkey) or to replace the Makarios government with one amenable to enosis, and which would accept a "NATO-ite solution." Such a plan, propagandists say, is aimed at abolishing the independence of Cyprus and converting it into an unsinkable aircraft carrier, a NATO missile and nuclear base, and a permanent base for the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

Soviet accounts of the Greek "ultimatum" to Cyprus report that it denounced the head of the Cypriot state as completely unacceptable and lacking in strength. They add that the Greek demands included Cypriot recognition of the fact that Athens must play the main role in settlement of the Cyprus question, as well as reorganization of the Cypriot cabinet, and turning over "weapons at the disposal of the Cyprus Government" to the National Guard or the UN force. Moscow naturally makes no reference to the source of the weapons, which it says were to arm detachments created by the Government of Cyprus" to repulse a reactionary conspiracy.

PRAVDA and Moscow domestic service reports on the 14th claimed that Athens demanded inclusion in the new government of General Grivas, "who has been illegally in Cyprus for over five months," and added that this was the first time Greece had officially supported Grivas. Grivas--leader of the EOKA underground during Cyprus' struggle for independence--is assailed as a NATO agent heading underground reactionary groups and carrying out subversive activities aimed against Archbishop Makarios and the Cypriot Government. TASS on the 11th cited a Cypriot Government spokesman as stating that the source of the "abnormal situation" was General Grivas, and as referring to recent arms thefts by "armed detachments illegally formed" in Cyprus by Grivas. The PRAVDA article on the 14th called attention to the fact that "nationalist propaganda" in Athens was accompanied by anticommunist, anti-Soviet outbursts in Greek media to back up Greece's ultimatum and to justify Athens' right to interfere in Cypriot internal affairs.

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As for the Soviet position, comment repeats that it is "unchanged" from that set forth in the communique on Makarios' visit to the USSR last June, which called for respect for the national sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the Cyprus Republic and said the USSR opposed any intervention, interference, or threat to use force against Cyprus.

Cyprus has also figured in recent general Soviet propaganda on the Mediterranean in connection with the British-Maltese confrontation over Britain's use of Malta's military facilities, as well as in conjunction with comment on the U.S.-Greek talks on Sixth Fleet home ports. Such linkage continues, a Yermakov article in PRAVDA on the 13th, for example, claiming that NATO circles are interested in a change in the Cyprus situation, and are counting on settling on the island if "anti-Malta blackmail" fails. The Pentagon, Yermakov added, would thus acquire an additional opportunity to obtain convenient bridgeheads for transferring weapons and aircraft to Israel, which is described in several Soviet commentaries as overjoyed by U.S. acquisition of home-port rights in Greece.

Calling it hardly accidental that pressure on Cyprus coincided with announcement of the establishment of U.S. Sixth Fleet "bases" in Greece, TASS commentator Kornilov on the 16th said the dangerous development of events in the eastern Mediterranean caused "concern and anxiety." He claimed that "European and world public opinion" condemn "gross interference" by NATO and Greece in Cypriot affairs, and cautioned that attempts to turn the island into an arena of armed clashes could only be regarded as "a very dangerous step" counter to the interests of peace and relaxation of tension. And a Shlenov commentary in Italian on the 15th said events in Cyprus show the danger to the independence of states involved in NATO military bases. Also citing the "offensive" against Malta as well as the Piraeus port agreement, Shlenov professed to see a "vast plan" for strengthening NATO's military and strategic positions in the eastern Mediterranean. He employed a variation of the "proximity" formula in warning that "those who cede their own territory" and those who seek to undermine the neutrality and independence of the Mediterranean countries "should be reminded that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to whatever takes place in the sea neighboring its southern borders."

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YUGOSLAVIA - U. S.

BELGRADE WELCOMES PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS ON YUGOSLAVIA

Against the background of the recent upheavals climaxed by Tito's purge of nationalist and liberal elements in Croatia, Belgrade has reacted cordially and apparently with some relief to the passages in President Nixon's foreign policy report reaffirming U.S. readiness to further improve relations with Yugoslavia. Commenting on the report at his regular press conference on 10 February, as reported by TANJUG, Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat spokesman Milan Zupan remarked: "We attach great importance to President Nixon's statement that Yugoslavia is a factor of peace and stability in Europe and elsewhere, as well as his comment on the indivisibility of peace and security in Europe." Noting that the report also expressed U.S. readiness to further develop economic and other relations with "nonaligned Yugoslavia," Zupan said Belgrade is similarly interested in developing relations with the United States, "in accordance with and on the foundations of the joint Washington statement" signed during Tito's U.S. visit last fall.

An article in the semiofficial BORBA on the 11th similarly hailed "the positive attitude of the President toward nonaligned Yugoslavia" but was critical "of the Metternich-like approach to international politics" that it discerned in "the President's conviction that in the foreseeable future the world will experience a new strategic balance between the big powers." BORBA questioned: "Was not the system of Metternich destroyed as early as in the first confrontation with the revolutions and struggle of small powers for their independence?"

In contrast, Radio Zagreb's chief political commentator, Milika Sundic, praised the President's report warmly as "a step forward in U.S. foreign policy, which has all the characteristics of a rational and important document." Although remarking without elaboration that many of the President's positions could be disputed, Sundic said that "taken as a whole the report also gives hope to the whole world, considering that such a great power comprehends the inevitability of negotiations and a peaceful life with all, regardless of ideological differences and special interests."

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Reflecting apparent Yugoslav relief that recent events in Yugoslavia have not adversely affected relations with the United States or the prospects for further U.S. investment, Sundic commented gratuitously that "it is very good that President Nixon did not accept the completely erroneous assessments of our internal situation that appeared in the Western press, including some American papers." Alluding to press speculation that Tito's hardline crackdown might signal a closer movement toward the Soviet bloc, Sundic added: "For us it is also no less important that the head of the White House speaks about Yugoslavia as a nonaligned country, in which we see a U.S. interest that we remain such. . . . We can only welcome such an attitude toward us, and we are fully justified in our insistence that all other international factors, too [read: the Soviet bloc], treat us in the same way."

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USSR - HUNGARY

UNHERALDED KADAR VISIT SUGGESTS MOSCOW-BUDAPEST TENSIONS

The sudden departure of Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) First Secretary Janos Kadar on the 11th for Moscow, where he spent four days, followed the appearance of articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA reflecting apparent Soviet concern over freewheeling tendencies on the part of the Budapest regime, particularly in the economic sphere. The surfacing of Moscow-Budapest tensions may have been foreshadowed in an article by Zoltan Komocsin, MSZMP Secretary in charge of international party affairs, in the September issue of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM which included a cryptic complaint about those who "evaluate our affairs from a distance."

The leading bone of contention appears to be the Hungarians' determination to further develop trade with the West and utilize market-economy methods in their domestic planning, as features of Kadar's "economic reform." At the same time, the Hungarian regime has taken pains to keep its image respectable in Moscow's eyes through due support for CEMA integration and participation in Warsaw Pact activities and by serving as Moscow's proxy, in mid-1971, in openly criticizing the maverick policies of the Romanians vis-a-vis China.

KADAR VISIT MTI on the morning of the 11th announced Kadar's departure for Moscow on an "unofficial, friendly visit." TASS' initial report of his arrival in the Soviet capital did not include any characterization of the visit, but TASS reran the report 10 minutes later adding the phrase "for an unofficial, friendly visit." The welcoming delegation included Brezhnev and Katushev, CPSU Secretary in charge of party relations with communist countries.

A final communique on Kadar's visit broadcast in the Moscow domestic service on the 14th* recorded "cordial friendship and complete mutual understanding" and "complete identity of views,"

* The Moscow domestic service did not use the label "communique," but the same item was so identified in the Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP on 15 February, which attributed the item to TASS, and in the Budapest NEPSZABADSAG on the same date.

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but its handling of the details of the talks implied less than complete accord. Thus it said Brezhnev and Kadar "informed each other" on communist and socialist construction in the two countries and had "an exchange of views" on "topical" questions of economic cooperation under the comprehensive integration program adopted by the CEMA member countries last July in Bucharest. In reporting that "agreement" had been reached on a visit by a Soviet party-government delegation to Budapest "in 1972," the communique added that "certain problems of the international situation and of the world communist and workers movement have been discussed during the talks." It went on to note, in this connection, that the two parties' resolve "to continue contributing toward the strengthening of unity and comprehensive cooperation of the socialist countries, the cohesion of the anti-imperialist forces . . . , has been stressed at this time."

The Moscow broadcast said Brezhnev and Kadar "exchanged friendly toasts" at a Kremlin dinner on the 14th, but the substance of their remarks has not been released.

PRAVDA ARTICLE An article entitled "Coordinaces of Solidarity" by Budapest correspondents Gerasimov and Odinets in the 3 February PRAVDA took a gratuitous hard look at manifestations of nationalism in Hungary, pegged to a conversation with Hungarian veterans of the Spanish Civil War. The article recalled that "there was a time in Hungary" when orthodox internationalist attitudes were attacked as "dogmatism," and it stressed the importance of concern on this score "under present conditions, where there is a greater need for struggle against various manifestations of nationalist ideology." It went on to assert that "today the MSZMP, rejecting any form of anti-Sovietism, believes that the attitude toward the Soviet Union is the cornerstone in politics," and it recalled Kadar's statement at the November 1970 MSZMP congress that "a correct and principled attitude toward the Soviet Union serves as the yardstick of internationalism."

Pressing the point, PRAVDA added that the Hungarian party "keeps a close watch on the mood and opinions of the people" and "opposes those who try to take advantage of democracy and freedom of criticism as a charter of immunity for propagating anticommunist, anti-Soviet, and nationalist views hostile to socialism." The correspondents also reported that MSZMP Secretary Komocsin had stressed to them, in a conversation at party headquarters, the need "to be constantly displaying manifestations of internationalism" in order to gain victory over "nationalist prejudices and egoism."

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IZVESTIYA ARTICLE An article entitled "Integration and National Interests" by Peter Valyi, Hungarian deputy premier and CEMA representative, in the 9 February morning edition of IZVESTIYA was notable for its preoccupation with the integrity of national interests under CEMA integration, a feature which Moscow's routine propaganda on CEMA usually mentions only in passing. Valyi declared at the outset that along with the interests of the socialist community as a whole, "the national interests of every participant country will be strictly observed" and that "the levers of independent and sovereign leadership of the national economy, such as independent economic and financial policy and national economic planning, remain entirely in the hands of each" member country.

In going on to spell out current examples of CEMA cooperation, the article conveyed the impression that radical changes in the direction of integration were neither necessary nor likely in the short term. Thus Valyi portrayed socialist economic integration as "a prolonged process, entailing some difficulties," whose specific implementation "lies largely in the future." Underscoring the difficulties, he said the participating countries' "levels of economic development are not identical," that "where agreement is reached on the main questions, different approaches exist to the resolution of some particular questions," and that "some solutions have not yet been theoretically, or at any rate practically, formulated."

KOMOCSIN ARTICLE Zoltan Komocsin's article in the September issue of the international communist monthly **PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM** was entitled "The Marxist-Leninist Party Prior To and After Seizing Power." Largely devoted to recounting the Hungarian party's failures in stemming the rightist inroads that produced the 1956 "counterrevolution," the article wound up with what amounted to a plea for freedom for the Hungarians to develop their own programs without outside interference. Thus Komocsin invoked "historical experience" as proof that socialist countries have solved "concrete problems" such as economic management and planning "in different ways" and stressed that "difficulties" on this score should be ironed out through "bilateral and multilateral exchanges of experience." Such talks, he added, must be "principle-minded and comradely" ones which "rule out in advance interference in the internal affairs of one party or another and the violation of the principles of independence."

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In a terse, implicit justification of Hungary's participation in the August 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, Komocsin conceded that "a Marxist-Leninist position" may involve "assistance." But he went on to level a charge at which, in the absence of a specific target, Moscow could take offense:

We consider quite untenable the views occasionally expressed which evaluate our affairs from a distance without considering the objective conditions dictating some or other steps. They try from the viewpoint of their own wishes or abstract and moral considerations to advise us on how to act most correctly in various situations. We are always willing to listen to sensible advice, but we can hardly accept advice which gives no consideration to our specific conditions and which in our opinion contradicts the interests of the cause of socialism.

Komocsin invoked the CPSU Central Committee report delivered by Brezhnev at the 24th congress last year on the point that "the learning of mutual concrete experience at all levels" in cooperation between the socialist countries must be "more thorough." He added that "this thesis is of fundamental importance" and in "full harmony" with the Hungarians' "national interests" and "international goals."

CENSURE FROM PRAGUE The Prague radio, describing Komocsin's article as "very remarkable," broadcast it in two installments in the domestic service on 18 and 19 October. And a speech by conservative Czechoslovak Presidium member Bilak to the party plenum on 21 October included direct criticism of Kadar's policies, according to purported unpublished excerpts of the speech appearing recently in the Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA and reported by AFP on 15 February. Czechoslovak media had carried a summary of Bilak's speech at the time: Appearing in the Prague domestic service on 21 October and in RUDE PRAVO the next day, the summary included only generalized attacks on "opportunism, revisionism and anti-Sovietism, and any splitting activities" as well as on "all centrifugal tendencies."

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The purported unpublished excerpts, according to AFP, include the specific charge that Hungary is about to "commit the same mistakes the Czechoslovak leaders committed in 1966-67," when Novotny let the economic machinery slip out of control, setting in motion in Hungary "centrifugal forces which in time might cause difficulties for the party leadership itself." Bilak was quoted as adding: "Our Hungarian brothers have been informed of the Czechoslovak point of view." The purported excerpts of Bilak's remarks also included censure of Romanian, Polish, and East German attitudes.

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ITALIAN CP CONGRESS

ALBANIA REJECTS INVITATION; CZECHOSLOVAK ISSUE STILL ALIVE

Four weeks in advance of the 13th congress of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), to be held 11-17 March in Milan, the Albanian Communist Party has issued a vituperative, polemical rejection of a PCI invitation to the congress against the backdrop of renewed PCI polemics on the persisting sore point of Czechoslovakia.

The Albanian party's position was spelled out in a 13 February editorial in its central organ, ZERI I POPULLIT, which noted that the AWP had refused even to take delivery of the invitation from the "revisionist" PCI. "Albanian communists," ZERI I POPULLIT declared, "have not had and do not want to have any ties or contacts of any form at any level with the Italian revisionists." Reiterating past AWP indictments of the PCI and asserting that the PCI has changed "not at all" from its revisionist line, the editorial concluded that the Italian party has in practice become an integral member of the bourgeois camp, that the ideas of "the Italian way of socialism" amount to "the most reformist code of modern revisionism," and that the PCI's role in dividing the international communist movement and in promoting the "revisionist degeneration of a good many communist parties" can be likened to "that of the Soviet Khrushchevites."

The Albanian editorial granted that "dissident revisionist" parties such as the PCI have differences with the Soviet "revisionists" on "certain specific questions concerning international relations." It explained the AWP's rejection of the PCI's invitation on grounds of the "Marxist-Leninist principle" that "one cannot have contacts and discussions with some revisionists just because differences and contradictions exist between them and other revisionists"--a dictum that could also apply, critically, to Peking's recent talks with a delegation of the Carrillo-led faction of the Spanish Communist Party rather than with the "Marxist-Leninist" Spanish communist party which Tirana supports.

In an earlier passage the editorial took cognizance of the root cause of PCI-CPSU disharmony in recalling that the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia had been "a hard blow for the so-called liberal wing of modern revisionism." It added that

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the Western "revisionists" were "forced by the circumstances to openly express their disappointment over the Kremlin's military adventures."

The issue of Czechoslovakia, the dominant one that culminated in the PCI's denunciation of the "Brezhnev doctrine" at its 12th congress in February 1969, has returned to the forefront of PCI comment. Thus the PCI restated its views on Czechoslovak developments in the context of comment on the early-January arrest of Italian journalist Valerio Ochetto in Prague on charges of antistate activities and the arrest in early February of a second Italian journalist, PCI member Ferdi Zidar, who had been on the editorial board of the party organ L'UNITA before being assigned to the Prague-based secretariat of the International Organization of Journalists.

On 5 February, for example, L'UNITA declared that the PCI had "never failed to divulge in the most precise and authoritative way our opinion on what has been taking place in Czechoslovakia since August 1968." The article expressed hope that current events in Czechoslovakia would not "contradict the pledges to avoid repression and trials." And the PCI theoretical weekly RINASCITA, according to L'UNITA on the 11th, asked rhetorically if the arrests of the journalists were a "prelude to an abandonment" of the pledge made by the present Czechoslovak leaders that there would be no return to repression and trials.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

ARRESTED UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST DISSIDENTS FACE TRIAL

The Ukrainian press and radio on 11 February announced that "criminal" proceedings have been instituted against recently arrested Ukrainian dissidents in connection with the arrest of the Belgian tourist Jaroslav Dobosh on charges of being an agent of Ukrainian emigre circles and imperialist intelligence services. This announcement follows the unusual 15 January announcement of Dobosh's arrest by the KGB and the 21 January press attack on leading dissidents Svyatoslav Karavanskiy and Vyacheslav Chornovil. The unusual publicity surrounding these cases, which contrasts sharply with the secret arrests and trials of the past, is evidently designed to intimidate Ukrainian dissidents.

The present case apparently began with the 12-13 January arrest of 12 (or 14) dissidents in Kiev and 7 in Lvov and the 15 January announcement of Dobosh's arrest for "subversive anti-Soviet activity." Subsequently, according to dissident sources in late January, five of the Kiev dissidents were released. However, a 21 January LITERATURNA UKRAINA article assailed Western radio and emigre organizations for treating Karavanskiy as a writer and Ukrainian nationalist patriot. It declared that he had been a Nazi collaborator and an agent of foreign intelligence and emigre organizations and had been convicted of spying. The article also attacked the "likeminded" Chornovil. The most recent announcement reveals that Ivan Svitlichnyy, Chornovil and Yevhen Sverstyuk are among those who have been "brought to criminal responsibility" for "activities hostile to the socialist system and in connection with the Dobosh case." The best-known Ukrainian dissident, Kiev writer Ivan Dzyuba, is not mentioned in the announcement, which ominously reveals that the investigation is continuing.

Another sign of a more repressive atmosphere in the Ukraine is that it was the only republic to react to the January Central Committee decree on literary criticism with newspaper editorials sharply attacking individuals and publications for deviations (PRAVDA UKRAINY, 1 February; RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 29 January; and LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 28 January).

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CONSERVATIVE WRITERS PROVOKE THE IRE OF AUTHORITIES

On 25 January the Central Committee published a decree on literary criticism which reiterates a catalogue of generalized complaints but provides little clue to its main thrust and purpose. However, a writers union plenum opening the following day concentrated on the faults of conservative and reactionary literary critics--suggesting that they rather than the long-beleaguered liberals are the main target of the Central Committee decree.

Since the early 1970 purge of the NOVY MIR editorial board, liberals have posed much less of a problem to the regime. Even the audacious publication in NOVY MIR last October of Yevgeniy Markin's poems defending Solzhenitsyn in veiled language has not provoked new attacks or punitive actions against the journal, although Markin himself was reportedly expelled from the writers union. The 26-28 January writers union plenum only briefly recounted past errors by liberal critics: V. Kardin's 1966 debunking of historical myths, Vladimir Lakshin's 1964-65 defense of truth in literature, and the excessive attacks on "mistaken" Russophile views by YUNOST deputy editor Vladimir Voronov in 1968 and by former NOVY MIR deputy editor Aleksandr Dementyev in 1969. The plenum's main complaints were directed at the ultra-conservative, peasant-oriented Russophiles grouped around the youth journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA and the worker-oriented neo-Stalinists of Vsevolod Kochetov's OKTYABR, who have been among the harshest critics of the Russophiles.

RUSSOPHILES The campaign against the MOLODAYA GVARDIYA
ASSAILED group begun in late 1968 culminated in the
January 1971 ouster of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA chief
editor Anatoliy Nikonov. The MOLODAYA GVARDIYA group would
again appear to be a major target of the most recent Central
Committee censure since many of the generalized criticisms in
the decree are aimed at the kind of deviations committed by the
group and because the decree is addressed to the field of
literary criticism in which most members of the group specialize.

The main speaker at the January plenum, chairman of the council on literary criticism Vitaliy Ozerov, extensively criticized the MOLODAYA GVARDIYA group for "non-class, anti-historical idealization" of the past and pitting the village against the city. He complained that the group still had not drawn

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appropriate conclusions from previous criticism (LITERARY GAZETTE, 2 February). Another plenum speaker, Aleksandr Mikhaylov, complained that some persons "mistakenly suppose that principled conservatism toward everything new is the best form of defending and preserving cultural-historical national traditions," and he defended a poem by Valentin Sidorov which ridiculed the Russophiles (LITERARY RUSSIA, 4 February). Immediately after the plenum PRAVDA on 1 February carried Aleksey Metchenko's article, "Man and Progress," which defended scientific-technical progress and criticized some village writers for their "fear of the intrusion of the machine into the idyllic world of nature," "fear of 'machine civilization,'" and "poetization" of the past.

"PURGE" OF OKTYABR The plenum also revealed that punitive action had been taken against OKTYABR's editorial board. However, the action taken thus far is much less severe than that experienced by NOVY MIR and MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. Where NOVY MIR had acquired two new deputy editors and three other new editorial board members in February 1970 (leading to the subsequent resignation of chief editor Tvardovskiy), and where MOLODAYA GVARDIYA had acquired a new chief editor in early 1971, OKTYABR merely experienced the demotion of deputy editor Nikolay Gorbachev to ordinary membership on the editorial board--as of the January 1972 issue (signed to press 24 December). Chief editor Kochetov and his closest collaborators (deputy editor Petr Stokov and editorial board secretary Yuriy Idashkin) were not affected by the change. Nevertheless, RSFSR Writers Union Chairman Sergey Mikhalkov in his plenum speech indicated that the change in the OKTYABR board was meant to be punitive. Mikhalkov, one of the leading conservative hatchetmen in the writers union, declared that the RSFSR Writers Union secretariat had repeatedly discussed articles in OKTYABR and had evaluated them as "serious errors by the journal's editors." The secretariat, he added, "was forced to adopt a decision on strengthening the editorial collegium and editorial apparatus of the journal, which also conforms to recommendations contained in the Central Committee decree" (LITERARY GAZETTE, 2 February).

Kochetov's extreme anti-intellectual, neo-Stalinist views have been antagonizing the regime in recent years. His late 1969 novel What Do You Want? was panned by critics and apparently is relegated to oblivion since all the articles commemorating Kochetov's 60th birthday in early February 1972 conspicuously

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ignored this novel in the listings of his major works. He also came under fire in 1970 for publishing works considered too extreme by the regime, such as the works of the young Stalinist poet Feliks Chuyev. Kochetov disputed some of this criticism at a December 1970 expanded session of the RSFSR Writers Union secretariat (LITERARY GAZETTE, 9 December 1970), and Chuyev has remained a frequent contributor to OKTYABR. LITERARY GAZETTE's frequent attacks on OKTYABR's works prompted Kochetov to counterattack in the May 1971 issue of OKTYABR. However, PRAVDA intervened in an unsigned article on 18 May and rebuked OKTYABR for its attack on LITERARY GAZETTE, and LITERARY GAZETTE has continued its sniping at OKTYABR. Moreover, at the most recent writers union plenum Ozerov also criticized an article in OKTYABR for its anti-intellectual bias.

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CHINA

ANHWEI, KWANGTUNG PROVINCES REVEAL UNPUBLICIZED PARTY PLENUMS

On 10 February the Anhwei provincial radio reported that the third plenum of its CCP committee was held from 23 January to 5 February. On 12 February the Kwangtung provincial radio, in a report on the eighth session of its revolutionary committee, observed in passing that the session had been "convened after the third plenary session" of the provincial party committee.

Although FBIS provides quite thorough coverage of the provincial radios of Anhwei and Kwangtung, no previous report of a second party plenum for either province had been monitored. All the provincial party congresses, along with the concluding first plenums of the new committees, had been publicized by NCNA, Radio Peking, and the provincial radios during the December 1970-August 1971 period; but previously no third plenum had been reported, and second plenums had been publicized only for Hunan, last December, and Shensi, last month. It is possible, of course, that many second and subsequent plenums are being reported only in the provincial newspapers, still largely unobtainable.

The Anhwei plenum report, unlike the report on the recent Shensi plenum, makes it clear that the Lin Piao affair was a major topic of discussion. The radio report attacked "swindlers having illicit relations with foreign countries" and "sham Marxists," terms that have become identified with Lin and his followers.

The ANHWEI DAILY editorial on 10 February, greeting the conclusion of the session, detailed some of the anti-Lin charges. Most of the criticisms seem aimed at leftist errors such as branding those who make mistakes as enemies, confusing party policies on classes, and undermining the party policy that most cadres are basically good by setting up another set of "criteria for cadres." This latter charge is clearly aimed at Lin's three criteria for cadres.

The editorial also scored various economic errors by the "sham Marxists" who, it is alleged, ignored China's actual economic situation; they sought to rush to a form of "sham communism" by means of such nefarious activities as undermining the system of "to each according to his work." Party committees at all levels, the editorial warned, must guard against such efforts to sabotage correct policy by those who seem leftist but are really rightist.

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Kwangtung media released no details of their provincial party plenum, but the report of the revolutionary committee session noted that the "session profoundly criticized the counterrevolutionary crimes and various absurd, reactionary theories of swindlers like Liu Shao-chi." The report stated that the crimes of the "swindlers," such as trying to usurp party and state leadership, were exposed. The session also concentrated on instructing cadres in party policies, especially rural economic policies.

ACTUAL FIGURE FOR 1971 ANHWEI GRAIN PRODUCTION PROVIDED

The report on the Anhwei party plenum provided the first provincial grain production figure since the PRC stopped providing economic statistics after the "leap forward." The report claimed that 1971 grain output reached 27 billion catties or 13.5 million tons, a seven percent increase over 1970. In 1957, the last year in which China provided statistics, Anhwei was credited with slightly under 11.5 million tons.

The claimed increase over the past 11 years is thus only about 1.5 percent per year, less than the probable population growth, and only about half the national rate of grain increase claimed. Peking has said that the 1971 national grain harvest totaled 246 million tons, up about three percent per year from the 1957 claim of 185 million.

The Anhwei figures tend to throw some doubt on the national production claims. Anhwei has, however, suffered from natural disasters over the past few years when other provinces seemed to be making great gains in grain production. In 1969 Anhwei media made the rare admission that the early harvest had actually been "poor," and claims of record harvests in 1970 and 1971 were accompanied by references to the necessity to overcome natural disasters. Nevertheless, Anhwei media have indicated that considerable efforts have been made to increase production, especially in the poor North Anhwei area; according to NCNA on 31 December, this area has increased production by over 35 percent since 1969. In view of these efforts it is difficult to see why Anhwei should lag so far behind the national average.

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